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A B S T R A C T
Introduced in 2010, the Low Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF) was a major development in the regulatory regime
for electricity distribution networks in Great Britain, yet evaluation of its design and implementation has been
limited. This paper examines the type and quality of innovation arising from the LCNF. Novel frameworks for
assessing innovation project activity and learning are presented and results from their application to the LCNF
are discussed. Reduction of uncertainty through the production of high quality evidence is argued to be the
primary purpose of innovation project funding support. The analysis of LCNF project activity ﬁnds a step change
in Research Development & Demonstration (RD&D) spend and stakeholder engagement by network licensees in
Britain; however, the innovation observed was considered to be conservative and incremental in nature. It was
found that the LCNF lacked a strategic approach to targeted learning and the reduction of uncertainty for in-
novation priority areas. Project learning outputs were contradictory and inconclusive for several innovations.
Strategic learning should be a core part of policy makers’ design of innovation funding mechanisms for energy
technology, and a framework for shaping, capturing and assessing the learning outputs of funded innovation
projects is essential.
1. Introduction
The landmark Paris Climate Agreement was signed in December
2015 by 195 countries at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21)
obligating all parties to limit global temperature rise to less than 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2016). World leaders at Paris
emphasised the critical role energy technology innovation will play in
achieving this goal leading to the establishment of Mission Innovation
(2016): an agreement between 21 regions to double their clean energy
research, development and demonstration (RD&D) investment by 2021.
All but one of the partners has listed electricity grid innovation as a
priority area.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is one
such country that has situated electricity network innovation at the
centre of its decarbonisation strategy (DECC, 2015). Traditionally the
electricity networks of Great Britain (GB) have facilitated the trans-
mission and distribution of electricity from large-scale centralised
power stations, with highly predictable baseline supply, to consumers
with well understood patterns of aggregated demand. However, recent
years have seen a shift towards the deployment of intermittent elec-
tricity generation and the move to decentralised generation from a
combination of consumers and smaller-scale generators; a growing
emphasis on the electriﬁcation of heat and transport also signiﬁcantly
changes the nature of demand (National Grid, 2016; Committee on
Climate Change, 2016).
Historically, in the era since privatisation, the electricity distribu-
tion networks of GB were not conceived of as a hotbed of innovation
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2015). However, following a combination of
landmark climate change legislation and low-carbon energy policies
(HMSO, 2008, 2009b), the GB gas and electricity markets regulator,
Ofgem, has recently sought to stimulate innovation via its £500m Low
Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF) (Ofgem, 2010a).
Consultants commissioned by Ofgem published a review of LCNF in
2016 that aimed “to understand the extent to which the aims of the
LCNF have been met in supporting the future development of innova-
tion in the industry”. This concentrated on providing an assessment of
the costs and beneﬁts of innovation, concluding that beneﬁts to the
time of publication ran to approximately one third of the cost of the
innovation projects and estimating that future net-beneﬁt would run to
between 4.5 and 6.5 times the cost of funding the scheme (Poyry,
2016). However, characterising the types of innovation the LCNF has
facilitated at a programme level and assessing the quality of the learning
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achieved is essential if lessons are to be learned about how best to
support electricity network innovation via government policy and,
more broadly, about best-practice in operation, planning, management
and regulation of the electricity system. Consequently, this paper seeks
to provide policy makers with answers to all the following questions:
• What level of ﬁnancial innovation support did the LCNF provide?
• What number and type of innovation projects did the LCNF support?
• What observed quality of innovation and learning has been gener-
ated by the LCNF?
• What lessons can be learnt from the LCNF about how best to support
electricity network innovation in the future both in the UK and in-
ternationally?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of
literature relating to regulation and innovation in electricity network
industries. Section 3 outlines the history of the management of GB's
electricity network and policy-led initiatives to promote network in-
novation. Section 4 reviews recent studies examining the eﬀectiveness
of the LCNF. Section 5 presents the methodology for reviewing the type
and quality of the LCNF's innovation outputs. Section 6 presents the
results of the study. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the importance of these
ﬁndings and the resulting energy policy recommendations. Section 9
presents the study's conclusions.
2. Regulation and innovation of electricity network industries
This section outlines the core characteristics of electricity networks
and discusses the importance of state led regulation in order to promote
innovation.
2.1. Characterising the electricity network sector as a network industry
Electricity distribution networks are an example of a network in-
dustry, which has been deﬁned in (Bogaert, 2006, p. 20) as one that
“move[s] people, products or information from one place to another via
a physical network of a certain kind”. The beneﬁts of electricity net-
works are that: they allow generation resources to be located away from
where energy is used so enabling a reduction in the cost of access to the
primary fuel and minimisation of the impact of the conversion process
on population centres; and they permit a pooling of resources so that
provision of reserve generation to satisfy reliability of supply standards
can be achieved at least cost. In liberalised electricity supply industries,
interconnected networks also facilitate competition between generation
resources.
According to Bogaert (2006), network industries exhibit a number
of special characteristics that shape both the way they function and, in
turn, how they are managed. The ﬁrst is that network industries typi-
cally provide public services of national interest that make a critical
contribution to both economic growth and social welfare. Conse-
quently, they are often referred to as critical infrastructures that are
integral to national security, meaning their proper functioning is of key
national signiﬁcance. This requires measures capable of protecting a
combination of security and aﬀordability of supply (UKRN, 2015).
The second is that network industries are aﬀected by positive feed-
backs, most notably network externalities or increasing returns to scale,
which means that the “value to a buyer of an extra unit is higher when
more units are sold, everything else being equal” (Economides, 2006).
For example, in the case of electricity networks, consumers are able to
source electricity from a larger number of generators, theoretically in-
creasing competition and security of supply. They are also inﬂuenced
by other feedbacks such as the economies of scale (Haas, 2006), where
unit costs decline with increasing output. These two positive feedbacks
coupled with economic factors such as high sunk costs in network in-
frastructure (Arthur, 1994) and the power wielded by incumbent ﬁrms
that have a vested interest in the status quo (North, 1990; Pierson,
2000) can contribute to these network industries becoming ‘locked-in’
and resistant to the development and adoption of innovation.
The third is that network industries are typically subject to natural
monopolies, a consequence of the substantial sunken capital investments
and economies of scale noted above, meaning it is generally un-
economic to duplicate rival networks leading to the formation of a
natural monopoly (Bogaert, 2006; UKRN, 2015).
Finally, network industries are characterised by complementary
nodes and branches, meaning that networks are made up of physically
distinct but mutually dependent and inter-connected components
(Economides, 2006). The interconnected nature of networks poses
speciﬁc challenges, not least the potential for cascading eﬀects, where
failure in one component can result in knock-on eﬀects. In the worst
case, this can lead to wide-spread disruption aﬀecting the whole
system. For example, blackouts resulting from power network compo-
nents failures, such as the one that aﬀected 50 million North Americans
on the 14th August 2003 (Hines et al., 2009). System operators are
therefore faced with a particular kind of risk where the impacts of
unplanned events can be very large indeed (CIGRE, 2010).
Overarching characteristics of energy systems are: (1) the capital
intensiveness of energy technology investments; and (2) the longevity of
capital stock (Grubler et al., 2012). The ﬁrst relates to the energy sector
being “characterised by high upfront costs, a high degree of speciﬁcity
of infrastructure, long payback periods, and strong exposure to ﬁ-
nancial risk stranded assets (IEA, 2003)” (Grubler et al., 2012 p. 1674).
The second underlines how energy technology and infrastructure stock
typically lasts for a longer period of time compared with many other
sectors, meaning the turnover of stock is slower. This longevity and the
uncertainty of future need gives rise to the risk of stranding of assets
and, in turn, can instil a highly conservative and risk-adverse invest-
ment culture (IRENA, 2017).
2.2. Stimulating innovation in electricity networks via regulation
Innovation is widely considered to stem from a bid to capture a
larger market share by improving consumer value-for-money, either by
improving customer satisfaction and/or reducing a customer's costs
(Aghion and Griﬃth, 2005). Not only can this provide a direct beneﬁt
for the customer and the provider but also wider beneﬁts for society if
the innovation has a strong degree of social and environmental value,
often referred to as a triple bottom line (Elkington, 1997). However,
network industries such as electricity networks represent a special
challenge with regard to innovation. Firstly, as natural monopolies,
market forces are considered insuﬃcient to cultivate innovation via
competition (Economides, 2006; European Commission, 2013).
Without the threat of competing ﬁrms capturing market share, “a ﬁrm
with signiﬁcant market power does not naturally face the same pressure
or incentives to reduce costs or develop new services” (UKRN, 2015).
Secondly, given network industries’ predisposition to lock-in eﬀects
they tend to be slow to change and often resistant to the development
and adoption of new innovations (Grubler et al., 2012). In this context
“enabling the appropriate level of innovation is a particular challenge”
(UKRN, 2015) in network industries like the electricity sector.
The particular characteristics of network industries have led to state
intervention, commonly in the form of ex-ante regulation (where a
regulatory determination constraining maximum prices is made up-
front) and/or ex-post competition enforcement (where retrospective
review and adjustment of revenues is undertaken) (European
Commission, 2013). Regulation coordinated by an independent reg-
ulator has also been proposed in order to stimulate innovation by re-
plicating the conditions necessary to promote competition, whilst si-
multaneously safeguarding the functionality of the network and the
interests of both providers and consumers (European Commission,
2013; UKRN, 2015).
Stimulating competition and innovation through regulation has,
however, been criticised for inadvertently stiﬂing innovation (UKRN,
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2015). This is largely due to the prescriptive nature of regulation, in
particular price controls, which can constrain the scope of technology
and business model experimentation (UKRN, 2015). Consequently, an
alternative approach has been to include stimulus packages. These
packages are typically “funded through companies’ existing revenue
mechanisms but with additional requirements or conditions attached to
the speciﬁc elements of innovation funding” (UKRN, 2015). They tend
to be put in place by regulators where innovation may yield a strong
societal and/or environmental beneﬁt but not necessarily a corre-
sponding commercial beneﬁt (UKRN, 2015), often linked to the net-
work industry operating as a natural monopoly and having its income
tightly regulated. This approach has recently been applied in the UK
energy sector and this paper assesses both its characteristics and ef-
fectiveness in the following sections.
3. Brief history of GB electricity distribution network innovation
support
To establish the context within which the LCNF was conceived and
introduced, the history of GB electricity industry management and in-
novation support is reviewed in this section.
3.1. Pre-1989: nationalisation
The electricity industry structure in Britain was nationalised in 1957
(HMSO, 1957). It consisted at this time of the Central Electricity Gen-
eration Board (CEGB), responsible for generation and transmission in
England and Wales, 12 regional Area Electricity Boards responsible for
distribution and supply in England and Wales and the Electricity
Council as an overseeing body. In Scotland, generation, transmission,
distribution and supply were all carried out by two regional vertically
integrated companies. RD&D was relatively well funded during this
period as the CEGB maintained a wide portfolio of power systems re-
lated research with three dedicated R&D labs and an annual total
budget rising steadily through the 1970s to reach £64m by the early
1980s (Littler, 1980).
3.2. 1989–2008: privatisation and liberalisation
The Electricity Act 1989 commenced a process of privatisation and
unbundling of the electricity system in Great Britain (HMSO, 1989).
The resulting system was comprised of separate licensed suppliers,
generators, transmission system operators and DNOs, regulated by the
Oﬃce of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, Ofgem (HMSO,
2000). An ex-ante regulation model was implemented, with prices
capped for 5 year periods and, under the RPI-X price control, linked to
the Retail Price Index (RPI) and an operational eﬃciency target set by
the regulator (X). During the ﬁrst three price control periods
(1990–2005) annual RD&D expenditure by DNOs declined steadily to a
low point of just £1 million by 2003/4 (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2015).
According to Bolton and Foxon (2010), during the period from priva-
tisation to the early 2000s, “the role of regulation was not to promote
innovation or favour particular technologies or methods; the focus was
on reducing costs and promoting short run eﬃciencies” (p. 14).
Moving into the fourth price control period (2005–2010), the en-
ergy policy context in GB was characterised by a growing emphasis on
carbon reduction and energy security (HMSO, 2003), seeing a shift
“away from reducing costs and promoting competition, towards en-
vironmental and sustainability goals” (Bolton and Foxon, 2010 p. 16).
If a new, lower carbon generation mix was to be accommodated at
least cost, signiﬁcant innovation in the planning and operation of net-
works would be required. There was an acknowledgement from Ofgem
that whilst the RPI-X price control had been eﬀective in promoting
eﬃciency it was less eﬀective in stimulating research and development
or the delivery of new objectives (Shaw et al., 2010; HoCECCC, 2010).
Consequently, the fourth price control period saw the introduction of
two new mechanisms to encourage network innovation: the Innovation
Funding Incentive (IFI) (Section 3.2.1), and Registered Power Zones
(RPZ) (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1. Innovation funding mechanism
The IFI oﬀered support for research and development projects that
tackled technical aspects (e.g. network design, operation and main-
tenance) of distribution networks (up to and including 132 kV) (Sauter
and Bauknecht, 2009; Russ, 2005) that had the potential to deliver
value to end consumers (i.e. ﬁnancial, supply quality, environmental,
safety). The scheme allowed companies to pass on to customers 80%1 of
their R&D costs up to a maximum of 0.5% of their total revenues
(HoCECCC, 2010). A number of network companies, e.g. National Grid,
reported using IFI to support work at Technology Readiness Levels
(TRLs) between 2 and 8 (National Grid, 2013).
The introduction of the IFI coincided with a signiﬁcant increase in
the level of electricity network R&D investment over the subsequent
years (Bolton and Foxon, 2010; Lockwood, 2016; Jamasb and Pollitt,
2015), reversing the steep decline in DNOs R&D investment (Shaw
et al., 2010), seeing DNO spending from approximately £1m in 2003/
04 to over £12m in 2007/08 (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011, 2015). How-
ever, by 2008 network companies had failed to make full use of their
0.5% allowance, spending only £12m of a potential £20m R&D, re-
presenting only 0.4% of their revenue (HoCECCC, 2010), with some
DNOs indicating that the rules governing the areas they could innovate
in as too narrow and strict (HoCECCC, 2010). Furthermore, investment
post-2008 plateaued up to 2012/13 (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011, 2015).
3.2.2. Registered power zones
The fourth price control included a DG Connection Incentive, pro-
viding DNOs with a means of increasing their revenue through con-
nection of DG projects (Russ, 2005). In parallel, the RPZ scheme sup-
ported later stage development and demonstration projects that
presented novel and more cost-eﬀective ways of connecting and oper-
ating distributed generation (DG) on their distribution systems (Sauter
and Bauknecht, 2009). In registering a DG connection as a RPZ the DNO
could then receive an additional incentive over and above the main DG
incentive (Russ, 2005). A maximum of £500,000 per year during the
price control period could be provided to each DNO for RPZ projects,
with funding proportional to the level of kW connected (Russ, 2005).
Whilst the scheme encouraged some innovative projects such as the
application of active network management in the Orkney Isles to avoid
the need for expensive network reinforcement (Currie et al., 2011), the
RPZ only delivered four schemes during its ﬁve years up to 2010 (Shaw
et al., 2010)
3.3. 2008–2015: climate change act and the LCNF
In 2008 GB embarked upon a low-carbon energy transition with the
climate change act (HMSO, 2008), carbon budgets (HMSO, 2009a), and
a low carbon transition plan (DECC, 2009). Electricity network in-
novation was identiﬁed as a core priority for achieving national dec-
arbonisation targets (LCICG, 2014).
3.3.1. Outline of the LCNF
In 2009 Ofgem proposed the £500m Low Carbon Networks Fund as
a catalyst for innovation within the price control period of 1st April
2010–31st March 2015 (Ofgem, 2009). The stated objective of the
LCNF was “to help DNOs understand how they provide security of
supply at value for money and facilitate transition to the low carbon
economy” (Ofgem, 2010a). Whilst the IFI was also retained, this new
1
‘Ofgem allowed 90% of the costs of IFI projects to be recovered in the ﬁrst year of the
price control, but this tapered oﬀ through the period to 70% in the ﬁfth year, in order to
incentivise early take up.’ (Lockwood, 2016 p. 118).
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mechanism oﬀered much greater sums of funding and allowed for de-
monstration projects in addition to R&D
The LCNF operated in a tiered format, funding smaller scale projects
as Tier 1, and running a Tier 2 annual competitive process to fund a
smaller number of large ‘ﬂagship’ projects. Tier 1 projects were allo-
cated a total allowance of £80 million over the 5 years and Tier 2
projects were allocated £320 million (£64 million per year). The re-
maining £100 million was retained for discretionary awards intended to
reward successful delivery of projects. With the IFI still providing a
funding route for lower TRL R&D, Tier 1 projects were speciﬁcally re-
quired to have a TRL between 5 and 8. TRL 9 was excluded, as projects
with this TRL were thought to be too low risk and oﬀer limited scope for
new knowledge to be generated. A TRL focus was not speciﬁcally de-
ﬁned for Tier 2 projects. However, a preference on demonstration was
strongly implied with guidance stating projects should not be at the R&
D stage and that methods being trialled should be “untested at the scale
and circumstance in which the DNO wishes it to be deployed and that
consequently new learning will result from the project” (Ofgem,
2010a).
The requirement that learning gained from projects should be dis-
seminated was a key feature of the LCNF. In the guidance for Tier 1 and
Tier 2 projects, DNOs were asked to demonstrate that the projects
would generate knowledge which did not exist before the proposed
trials. Tier 2 bids were also required to show a robust methodology to
capture and disseminate the learning (Ofgem, 2010a).
In designing the LCNF, Ofgem sought to simulate the risk and re-
ward that innovation oﬀers to unregulated companies. DNOs were re-
quired to provide 10% of the total project cost as a mandatory con-
tribution that could be recovered upon successful delivery. At the
application stage, Tier 2 projects were obliged to propose their own
Successful Delivery Reward Criteria (SDRC) linked to project mile-
stones, target outputs and learning dissemination activities. The process
for award of Tier 2 funding also instituted a direct form of competition
between the DNOs.
3.4. 2015–present: post-LCNF
Following a review of regulation for electricity distribution net-
works, a new framework commenced on 1st April 2015 (Ofgem,
2010b). The RIIO (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation +Outputs)
model featured an 8 year price control period and core incentives in-
tended to reward improvements in delivery of services to customers
and, in turn, provide an incentive for innovation. In addition, a time-
limited innovation stimulus was introduced as a successor to the LCNF.
The innovation stimulus includes three measures: a Network Innovation
Allowance (NIA); an annual Network Innovation Competition (NIC);
and an Innovation Roll-out Mechanism (IRM) (Ofgem, 2013a). NIC and
NIA may be seen as analogous to LCNF Tier 2 and Tier 1; however, the
scope of NIC is greater than LCNF Tier 2 as it includes development as
well as demonstration and allows cross-sectoral work. Both NIC and
NIA included an increased focus on customer beneﬁt; however, only the
NIC retained a speciﬁc requirement for innovation with a focus on low
carbon or environmental beneﬁts (Ofgem, 2013a).
3.4.1. Network Innovation Allowance (NIA)
Replacing both IFI and LCNF Tier1, the NIA provides limited
funding to RIIO network licensees to “fund smaller technical, com-
mercial, or operational projects directly related to the licensees network
that have the potential to deliver ﬁnancial beneﬁts to the licensee and
its customers” (Ofgem, 2017a) and/or help support development of
submissions to the NIC. It allows network companies to invest 0.5% of
allowed revenues, and in exceptional circumstances up to 1% can be
drawn down if they demonstrate a compelling innovation (Ofgem,
2013b). In turn it made available approximately £61m of funding per
annum for network innovation (Ofgem, 2017b).
3.4.2. Network Innovation Competition (NIC)
In contrast the NIC has been designed to support much larger
ﬂagship development and demonstration projects than those supported
through the NIA (Ofgem, 2017c). Funding is awarded as part of an
annual competition, where gas and electricity network companies
compete for funding for research, development and trialling for new
technologies, operating and commercial arrangements. Successful ap-
plicants must: (1) show how their innovations generate new knowledge
that can be shared amongst all network operators, (2) provide value for
money to network customers both now and in the future and (3) ac-
celerate the move to a low carbon energy sector and/or deliver en-
vironmental beneﬁts (Ofgem, 2017c). Overall the NIC is designed to
provide £70m per annum for electricity networks (2015–2016) and
£ 20m for gas networks (Ofgem, 2017b).
3.4.3. Innovation Roll-out Mechanism (IRM)
The IRM has been designed to facilitate the roll-out of Proven
Innovations and allow a licensee to recover funding associated with it.
The criteria revolve around delivery of carbon reductions, environ-
mental beneﬁts and long term value for money for customers. It must
also lead to cost savings that are greater than the implementation costs
(Ofgem, 2013c).
4. Studies examining the eﬀectiveness of the LCNF and
opportunities for further research
The eﬀectiveness of the LCNF has received some attention in the
literature. Lockwood (2016), examining the LCNF in the context of
political change, highlights that the LCNF sought to accelerate DNO
innovation activity by radically scaling up available funding and re-
quiring engagement with a range of partners, but points to a lack of
evidence of any resulting change in business as usual network operation
and investment. A high-level summary of LCNF project technical focus
found a strong emphasis on information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) for monitoring and visualising distribution network state
(Jenkins et al., 2015). Rhodes and Van Diemen (2016) reviewed the
LCNF with semi-structured interviews of a limited number of academic,
industrial and policy stakeholders. The interviews revealed a perception
amongst stakeholders that the LCNF had been successful in stimulating
DNO RD&D and incentivising a culture of innovation, but there were
concerns regarding the quality and rigour of learning methodology and
dissemination, and the scheme's ability to nurture radical and dis-
ruptive innovations. Evaluation and synthesis of outputs from LCNF
projects was not undertaken.
In prior work by the authors of this paper, a review of the outcomes
from LCNF projects undertook detailed synthesis and evaluation of
learning outputs (Frame et al., 2016). This review established cate-
gories to describe the focus of innovation activity and proposed a
method for evaluating project learning with respect to the readiness of
trialled innovations to be regarded as ‘business as usual’ options. The
focus of the review was to gather, synthesize and disseminate the key
learning and recommendations arising from LCNF projects, not assess
the eﬀectiveness of the LCNF as a regulatory mechanism. However, the
methodology and results of the review have since been developed, with
additional results and analysis situated in the wider literature allowing
further insight to be drawn on the eﬀectiveness of the LCNF and re-
levant policy recommendations, as presented in the subsequent sections
of this paper.
Ofgem commissioned an independent evaluation of the LCNF
(Poyry, 2016). The authors drew on the results and methodology from
Frame et al. (2016) but focussed on evaluating the potential ﬁnancial
beneﬁts that could be realised as innovations were adopted as core
business. Drawing on DNO surveys, the evaluation estimated current
realised beneﬁts to be approximately one third of the total funding cost;
however, DNOs indicated a belief that all innovations had potential to
be adopted as core business and that potential future net-beneﬁt from
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the LCNF projects was in the range of 4.5–6.5 times the cost of funding
the scheme. Detailed analysis of the quality of learning outputs was not
included.
Detailed retrospective analysis of ﬂaws in the LCNF design, and
hence wider sectoral lessons on innovation stimulus, were not within
the scope of these recent reviews; however, a shared observation was
the apparent lack of a high-level strategic approach or coordination
with the wider industry, resulting in a lack of clear messages with re-
spect to the innovations investigated under the programme.
4.1. The signiﬁcance of the LCNF for innovation funding in GB
The literature demonstrates that the LCNF was a step change in
available network related RD&D funding. Jamasb and Pollitt (2015)
note that, at its point of introduction, the LCNF represented an increase
in available RD&D ﬁnancial support by a factor of 5. As set out in
Section 3.2, annual expenditure by DNOs on RD&D dramatically de-
clined following privatisation; however, following the introduction of
IFI and RPZ, expenditure recovered to just over £12 million in 2007/8
and ﬂuctuated a little up to 2012/13 at which point spend was at
around £13m (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2015).
Full data on actual DNO RD&D spend during the LCNF period has
not been published; however, data for four DNOs (Poyry, 2016) shows
annual IFI spend relatively stable between £5m and £10m, with LCNF
spend increasing total spend by an additional £30m p.a. between 2010
and 2015.
By 31st March 2015, forty Tier 1 projects and twenty-three Tier 2
projects had been approved (Frame et al., 2016; Rhodes and Van
Diemen, 2016). In Fig. 1, the approved Tier 2 funding awards per
annum are shown, along with the numbers of projects approved or
rejected for funding each year. Over the 5 year period, £213m in total
was awarded to Tier 2 projects, representing 67% of the available Tier 2
funding. During the same period, £29.5m (37%) of the £80m available
for Tier 1 projects was awarded (Frame et al., 2016).
5. Methodology
This paper builds on previous work by the authors (Frame et al.,
2016). Two complementary frameworks developed and implemented in
that work are formalised and described in detail here.
The ﬁrst framework was designed to characterise the number and
type of network innovation projects that the LCNF has supported; the
second to provide a means of assessing the quality of innovation in
terms of the learning achieved.
For all 63 projects approved for funding between April 2010 and
March 2015, the bid pro-forma was reviewed and a project register
populated with data on the innovations trialled, funding levels, and key
stakeholders. Following this, a detailed review was conducted of
learning outputs from all funded projects that had closed by 31st
December 2015. The review included the close-down report for each
project and any other speciﬁc learning reports also published. In total,
over 100 learning output documents were reviewed.
5.1. Framework for assessing project activity
The framework for assessing project activity is shown in Table 1. It
has been designed to capture the high level policy drivers motivating an
LCNF project and also the key characteristics of distribution network
management around which investigations have centred and learning
has been achieved.
5.1.1. High level project drivers
Under the RPI-X regime (Section 3.2), the primary DNO business
driver was to provide a network service that met customer demand with
suﬃcient reliability at minimum cost, as set out in the Distribution
Code (The Distribution Code Review Group, 2017). Ofgem's LCNF
guidance introduced an additional objective: facilitate the low carbon
economy. This aligned the role of networks with the energy trilemma:
aﬀordability, security of supply and low carbon. The Smart Grid Forum,
established by Ofgem and the UK Government's Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC), comprises a broad range of industry sta-
keholders and has provided much of the analysis inﬂuencing Ofgem's
understanding of challenges for electricity networks during the low
carbon transition. Drawing on these sources, we deﬁne the following set
of high level policy drivers:
• Improvement of Reliability of Supply;
• Eﬃcient Facilitation of General Demand Growth;
• Facilitate new Low Carbon Demand; and
• Facilitate Distributed Generation.
5.1.2. Characteristics of Distribution Network Operators’ activities
Historically, the role of DNOs has been to manage network assets
that allow the transfer of electricity from the transmission network to
end customers. The core activities of distribution network planning and
design are: load forecasting, substation location and sizing, and feeder
routing and sizing (Lakervi and Holmes, 2003). Asset sizing is dictated
by accommodating peak power ﬂows within safe thermal limits, and
ensuring voltage quality meets statutorily deﬁned standards. Reliability
is addressed by including some redundancy in the infrastructure. Cost
eﬃciency is pursued by deploying the minimum amount of ‘primary’
infrastructure and ‘secondary’ monitoring and control to achieve these
aims safely. However, to date, this has largely been through passive
operation whereby operational actions concern responses to faults, re-
pairing aﬀected equipment and restoring supply (Bell et al., 2017).
Prior to the innovation incentives, the Interruptions Incentive
Scheme had already driven some innovation by DNOs in respect of
operation. This exposed DNOs to ﬁnancial rewards or penalties in
Fig. 1. Numbers of Tier 2 projects and total funding awarded per annum
(Frame et al., 2016; Poyry, 2016).
Table 1
Framework for assessing project activity.
High Level Policy Drivers
Increased Reliability of
Supply
Eﬃcient
Facilitation of
General Demand
Growth
Eﬃcient
Facilitation of
Low Carbon
Demand
Eﬃcient
Facilitation of
DG
Characteristics of DNO's Activities
Network Visibility and Design Network Operation
Improved
understanding of
system state and
limits
Monitoring and
Measurement
Power Flow
Management
Voltage
Control
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respect of customer interruptions customer minutes lost relative to set
targets (Ofgem, 2001). The main outcome was the installation of re-
mote control or, in some cases, automation to reconﬁgure the network
and accelerate the restoration of demand after an outage (Baker and
Meisinger, 2011). In addition, the low carbon transition has challenged
the passive nature of distribution networks (Bell and Hawker, 2015).
New DG and electriﬁcation of heat and transport give rise to potentially
much higher, more variable power ﬂows. Analysis suggests signiﬁcant
network infrastructure investment would be required to facilitate this
using current approaches to network operation. In order to minimise
the additional infrastructure required and more eﬀectively utilise it,
‘smart grid visions’ (European Commission, 2007; ENSG, 2009, 2010)
identify a shift from passive network management to more active op-
eration with a focus on the coordinated control of numerous resources
across distribution networks, exploiting ﬂexibility in the net ﬂows into
or out of the network at diﬀerent locations – the temporary curtailment
of generator output, the utilisation of storage or the time shifting of
demand – in order to stay within network limits.
Drawing on a GB focussed framework (ENSG, 2010) and the au-
thors’ detailed experience of DNO core business, we deﬁne two key
functional areas of DNO activity with respect to the challenges in-
troduced by the low carbon transition:
• Network visibility via monitoring and measurement and improved
understanding of the system's state; and
• Network operation via power ﬂow management and voltage control
utilising the improved understanding of the system's state.
Using this framework, innovations can be mapped to a functional
area and then categorised and grouped according to the methods or
equipment used.
5.2. Framework for assessing innovation project learning
Based on the importance of knowledge as an output of RD&D and
the focus that Ofgem placed on knowledge and learning in the LCNF
guidance, we argue here that the success of an innovation project, once
funded, should be judged on the quality of evidence generated. The
evidence may actually indicate the rejection of the innovation, or the
need for further work; if the evidence is strong and clear, the project
can be judged to have been a success regardless of whether the in-
novation is taken further or not. For mature innovations, the evidence
should allow robust decisions to be made regarding the commercial
viability and cost-eﬀectiveness of the innovation and the conditions
under which its deployment is justiﬁed. Similarly, projects that provide
robust, credible evidence that a less mature innovation remains pro-
mising and requires further work, or should be dropped, should also be
regarded as successes.
A novel framework for assessing innovation project learning
(Table 2), has been developed and implemented as a tool for assessing
whether a project has generated robust evidence on how attractive an
innovation is for adoption as a core business option ready to be de-
ployed when required.
The framework has been applied to the systematic retrospective
review of learning output publications with expert judgement used to
interpret both the DNOs’ published claims about the innovations and, to
the extent that the evidence has been published, the evidence itself.
This has been used to evaluate ‘Innovation Adoption Readiness’ with
scoring as shown in Table 2. The highest quality learning outputs are
those judged to provide strong evidence and hence allocated scores of
+/− 3 or 4.
The scoring criteria are based on an innovation's apparent readiness
to cost-eﬀectively address an energy network related need, if and when
required. They do not account for the likelihood of the need arising or
when it might arise. Part of the point of the innovation funding has
been to ensure readiness to accommodate changes to generation and
demand arising from the low carbon transition, the precise timing of
which is uncertain; if new, cost-eﬀective means of accommodating
them have not yet been developed and demonstrated by the time of
need, established, less cost-eﬀective or less ﬂexible methods or equip-
ment would have to be used.
A score of + 1 or +2 suggests a requirement for further develop-
ment work on the proposed innovation. However, if the need for the
innovation is yet to arise, there may be time for that further develop-
ment work to be carried out. If the various trials have suggested no
better solution to the particular system problem at hand and there is
conﬁdence that need will arise at some point, investment in further
work on such innovations attracting such a score would seem to be
justiﬁed.
As previously noted, project results have been reported by DNOs in
a range of formats with varying quality and depth. We discuss in
Section 8 how these limitations could be mitigated and the novel fra-
mework and approach described here could be applied within future
innovation funding mechanisms.
Given the nature of the LCNF Tier 1 and Tier 2 funding, in many
cases a DNO has undertaken one or more Tier 1 projects that laid the
foundations for a Tier 2 project. The learning outputs of these projects
are limited but complementary to the ﬁnal Tier 2 project outputs. For
these reasons, projects that are linked in this way have been assessed
together as one body of evidence, treated, in eﬀect, as a single DNO
project with a single Innovation Adoption Readiness.
6. Results
6.1. The objectives of LCNF innovation projects
This section presents a review of the prevalence of projects ad-
dressing the diﬀerent high level drivers and DNO activities outlined in
Section 5.1.
6.1.1. High level project drivers
Fig. 2 details the numbers of projects that addressed each high level
driver. Each project may have addressed more than one driver. The
dominant driver is the facilitation of DG connection to distribution
networks. Traditional DNO priorities of facilitating general demand
growth and improving reliability of supply receive similar amounts of
attention and facilitation of low carbon demand, such as newly elec-
triﬁed heat or electric vehicle charging, is the least prevalent driver.
6.1.2. Characteristics of Distribution Network Operators’ activities
The categories identiﬁed with respect to Network Operation via
Power Flow Management and Voltage Control were:
• Storage;
• Flexible Demand;
• Generator Control;
• Network Reconﬁguration; or
• Equipment for Active Regulation of Voltage.
Project activity in these categories is shown below in Fig. 3. In-
dividual projects may have been active in several categories.
Common deﬁnitions of smart grid functionality describe the evo-
lution of control functionality at the distribution network layer as a
critical aspect of future low carbon networks, e.g. ENSG, 2009;
European Commission, 2007. Therefore, during the categorisation
process, the method of control was used to further diﬀerentiate between
innovations. Local Control describes control of a single resource with
automated decision making based on measurement of the state of a
small number of network assets (often a single speciﬁc asset of concern)
and a given, local control target or goal. Coordinated Control describes
the use of multiple resources and optimisation of the network's state
over a wide network area taking fuller account of the
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interconnectedness of sites. The numbers of projects using local or co-
ordinated control are shown below in Fig. 4. With 51 out of 59 projects,
Local Control is clearly dominant.
The categories identiﬁed with respect to Network Visibility and
Design were:
• Real Time Thermal Ratings – the actual power transfer capacity of
network assets as inﬂuenced by observed, prevailing environmental
conditions rather than conservatively assumed conditions;
• Enhanced Network Visualisation – utilising network information for
planning and operation;
• Improved Understanding of Existing Demand – utilising information on
existing customer behaviour and consumption to improve knowl-
edge of how demand side customers are using the network;
• Improved Understanding of low carbon technology (LCT) – as above,
utilising information on customer behaviour and consumption to
improve knowledge of potential demand from electriﬁcation of
transport and new electriﬁcation of heat; or
• Enhanced Network Monitoring – ICT to gather a range of information
on the state of network assets, e.g. the power ﬂow or the voltage.
Fig. 5 details the number of projects addressing each of the Network
Visibility and Design categories. Individual projects may have been
active in several categories.
Enhanced Network Monitoring is clearly the dominant area of in-
novation activity across the full project portfolio. Localised Power Flow
Management using Storage, Flexible Demand, and Generator Control;
and localised Voltage Control using Equipment for Active Regulation of
Voltage are the most prevalent innovations related to network opera-
tion.
In summary, the main focus of innovation activity has been in im-
proving understanding of network conditions and deploying localised
responses to power ﬂow and voltage related network challenges.
6.1.3. Project partners
The stakeholders listed as active partners within each LCNF project
are shown in Fig. 6. DNOs have primarily turned to universities and
large power systems equipment specialists or consultancies as their
main collaborators. The role of local government and local community
group partners has been limited. Of the 30 projects involving uni-
versities, 22 published key ﬁndings on the future beneﬁt of the tested
innovation that were based primarily on academic modelling.
6.2. Assessment of innovation project learning
An assessment of the learning outputs was made using the frame-
work described in Section 5.2 for each DNO undertaking projects as
part of the LCNF.
6.2.1. Network operation
The Innovation Adoption Readiness scores for network operation
innovation projects are plotted in Fig. 7 below.
The distribution of scores, with a concentration in the range− 1 to
1, indicates that a signiﬁcant number of network operation focussed
projects were unable to deliver strong evidence for or against innova-
tion adoption. In particular, storage projects failed to deliver strong
conclusions. In contrast, projects on generator control provide strong
evidence either for or against adoption in the core business. Examining
the detailed scoring for Flexible Demand provides a further example
where the evidence is highly mixed. The scoring for the variants of
Flexible Demand innovations tested is shown in Fig. 8 where the lo-
cation and width of the central block indicates the mean and number of
projects scored respectively, and the ends of the whiskers indicate the
minimum and maximum scores from among the projects addressing
Table 2
Framework for assessing innovation adoption readiness.
Innovation Adoption Readiness Scoring Criteria
Strong Evidence For Adoption 4 The learning provides a strong conclusion that the innovation is technically and commercially ready for deployment when required
and the beneﬁts clearly justify the costs. Few barriers to adoption into core business are noted.
3 The learning concludes that the solution is technically and commercially ready for deployment when required and beneﬁts clearly
justify the costs. However, some further work is required on developing deployment capability and integrating the innovation into
existing systems and processes.
Indications For Adoption 2 The learning indicates a good level of beneﬁt relative to expected costs; however, some uncertainty remains around the beneﬁts and
costs, some work is still to be done to make the innovation ready for deployment if and when required.
1 The learning indicates the potential for a reasonable level of beneﬁt which, insofar as the learning includes a cost-beneﬁt analysis, are
expected to exceed costs; however, major uncertainty still exists around the potential beneﬁts and expected costs.
Inconclusive 0 The learning fails to provide clear evidence and reaches no clear conclusions on the innovation. However, the work conducted may
provide some lessons for further research requirements to provide suitable evidence.
Indications Against Adoption −1 The learning indicates some possible beneﬁts though, insofar as the learning includes a cost-beneﬁt analysis, costs seem to outweigh
the beneﬁts; major uncertainty still exists around the potential beneﬁts and expected costs.
−2 The learning indicates that the costs of the innovation are excessive relative to the beneﬁt; however, some uncertainty remains around
the beneﬁts and costs.
Strong Evidence Against Adoption −3 The learning concludes that the costs of the innovation are excessive relative to the beneﬁt. It does not explicitly rule out revisiting the
trialled innovation or notes that future technical or commercial developments may justify the innovation to be re-examined.
−4 The learning provides strong conclusions that the innovation is ineﬀective or the costs are excessive relative to the beneﬁt. It explicitly
states no intention to revisit the trialled innovation.
Fig. 2. Number of projects that address each context category.
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that category of innovation.
Methods that involve DNOs operating network assets in a particular
way to change the demand for power (voltage optimisation) or con-
tracting with Industrial & Commercial customers provided strong evi-
dence for adoption as core business options. The evidence is less con-
clusive for innovations more aligned with smart grid visions of control
of highly distributed energy resources (DER), such as demand side
management or response from residential loads, smart appliances or
new low carbon loads such as electric vehicles and heat pumps.
6.2.2. Network visibility
The Innovation Adoption Readiness scores for Network Visibility
innovation projects are shown in Fig. 9 below. The majority of network
visibility projects are concerned with enhanced network monitoring
and updating understanding of demand patterns in respect both of in-
dividual locations and how demands vary in time. The projects present
strong evidence that these innovations should be adopted within core
business. Although these results indicate that DNOs have identiﬁed
value in obtaining data, data itself has no value unless used to provide
understanding and knowledge. Innovations focussing on data utilisation
appear to be less ready for adoption.
7. Discussion
The review of LCNF background, motivation and structure (Sections
2 and 3) shows the introduction of the LCNF was a direct response to
signiﬁcant shifts in the focus of GB energy policy. With a low carbon
transition expected to signiﬁcantly disrupt the requirements placed on
electricity distribution networks, increased DNO RD&D was deemed
necessary for networks to evolve appropriately. Comparison of the
LCNF against historical RD&D spend demonstrates a step change in the
level of funding available for DNO led innovation projects. DNOs,
starting from a relatively low level of innovation spend, were expected
to rapidly accelerate their innovation activity and deliver large scale
projects with a focus on high TRL demonstration. The response of the
DNOs to this challenge is explored in this section and ﬁndings from the
analysis in Section 6 are discussed with respect to the research ques-
tions set out in Section 1.
7.1. Level of innovation support delivered
The total approved Tier 2 budget over the LCNF period represents a
take-up rate of 69% of the available funding, whilst the take-up rate for
Tier 1 projects was even less at 37%. In year 1, the full £64m available
for Tier 2 projects was awarded; by year 5 this had reduced to £22m. A
range of factors may be responsible for this underspent funding. The
ﬁrst is that, considering the lack of RD&D funding for network in-
novation prior to 2008 and that IFI funding restricted internal spend to
15% of project costs until mid-way through DPCR4, the DNOs are un-
likely to have possessed suﬃcient capacity to perform the RD&D being
supported by the scheme, particularly in undertaking multiple smaller,
in-house, more exploratory innovation projects. This may have mani-
fested itself as a lack of original ideas for network related innovations
amongst DNOs even though there can be value in undertaking projects
that address similar issues. As Ofgem's guidance says, “Projects that
address the same problem, but use a diﬀerent solution, will not be
considered as unnecessary duplicates. Projects that are at diﬀerent TRLs
Fig. 3. Project activity in network operation innovations.
Fig. 4. Projects employing local or coordinated control.
Fig. 5. Project activity in network visibility and design innovations.
Fig. 6. Number and type of project stakeholders.
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will not be considered as unnecessary duplicates” (Ofgem, 2010a).
However, Poyry (2016) found that a number of projects in Year 1 were
not funded due to duplication of ideas from which it may be concluded
that, in Year 1, DNOs were bidding for similar solutions and/or projects
at similar TRLs, arguably reﬂecting a relative lack of depth and breadth
in RD&D thinking.
The second potential reason may also be an indication of a mis-
match between the innovation stages, or TRL, the fund was targeting
and the maturity of technology at the time. The LCNF guidance for Tier
2 projects indicated pre-commercial demonstration. However, the large
degree of university support and associated degree of academic, lower-
TRL, work within Tier 2 projects suggests that most innovations of in-
terest to the DNOs were not ready for demonstration and still required
signiﬁcant development before reaching the mid-to-late stage TRLs.
In the context of DNOs’ lack of RD&D capacity and the relative lack
of demonstration stage projects of interest to DNOs, there is evidence to
support an argument that the LCNF design should have been shaped
towards encouraging a larger number of smaller, lower TRL projects in
the initial years with available budgets starting oﬀ small and growing as
conﬁdence was gained in DNOs’ ability to specify, commission and
deliver RD&D. Here RD&D priorities and areas of key uncertainty could
be identiﬁed, with an increasing focus on demonstration as the fund
progressed.
7.2. Type of innovation project activity
The dominant LCNF project driver has been shown to be ‘facilitating
DG connection’. The resultant project activity has primarily focussed
ﬁrstly on understanding how best to monitor networks and, secondly,
on implementing localised power ﬂow management to maximise the
utilisation of existing network assets and, where possible, avoid or defer
costly network reinforcement. This was achieved via ﬂexible demand,
storage and generator control. Analysis of the type of project activity
presents a picture of conservative, incremental innovation. In parti-
cular, the several projects focussing on generator control undertook
demonstration of reasonably well established active network manage-
ment technology. This complements the literature's reporting of stake-
holder perceptions (Section 4).
Various published innovation agendas, building on the smart grid
theme (DECC, 2014; ENSG, 2009; European Commission, 2007; LCICG,
2014), oﬀer ambitious visions with a much stronger importance placed
on the implementation of coordinated control of resources across the
network, particularly the use of distributed storage and aggregated
ﬂexible demand from residential and LCT loads to maximise the utili-
sation of some given network infrastructure both locally and system-
wide. Although DNOs have attempted a signiﬁcant amount of storage
and ﬂexible demand innovation within the LCNF, many projects have
mainly focused on single instance trials of equipment that can be de-
ployed, as and when required, in isolation with local control. These
were intended to provide a means of deferring conventional investment
in additional, local network capacity through additional primary assets
such as transformers or cables. Some projects have experimented with
wide-area, coordinated control on networks but have not reported clear
ﬁndings.
Few of the LCNF projects addressed the potential for distribution
connected resources to help manage the wider electricity system in
respect, for example, of whole system balancing. In many cases, it may
be that coordination of multiple instances of novel equipment could
realistically only be assessed once some degree of conﬁdence has been
gained in the equipment itself and that single instance deployment may
oﬀer more immediate rewards with less risk. However, evidence of a
strategic approach towards increased coordination was lacking and our
Fig. 7. Innovation adoption readiness scores for network operations focussed projects.
Fig. 8. Innovation adoption readiness scores for ﬂexible demand innovations.
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own experience of distribution networks suggests that there were op-
portunities for learning in respect of more optimal utilisation of existing
equipment and around commercial frameworks that were under-ex-
plored in the LCNF projects As the low carbon transition progresses,
failure to adopt more coordinated, active approaches to system opera-
tion risks either placing unnecessary barriers to the development of low
carbon technology or under-utilisation of network assets (Bell and Gill,
2018).
There has been relatively little attention to novel methods, working
practices or commercial arrangements, with DNOs’ focus in LCNF
projects mainly on equipment that was new to them. The attention
given to TRLs as an indicator of the maturity of a proposed innovation
or the degree of uncertainty associated with it may have, at least in-
directly, inﬂuenced the focus on technology. (Inevitably, a deﬁnition of
TRLs will address only technology and not methods or working prac-
tices (HoCSTC, 2011)).
7.3. Quality of evidence for innovation adoption readiness
The existence of uncertainty and the imperative to reduce it pro-
vides the fundamental justiﬁcation for allowing the use of customers’
money to support network innovation. The aim of innovation funding
support should be to reduce uncertainty through the generation of
knowledge to the long-term beneﬁt of users of the electricity system.
However, in this section we highlight that robust evidence regarding
the innovations explored has sometimes been lacking and discuss the
possible reasons for this.
In a number of cases there appears to have been poor initial design
of experiments where there was a failure to clearly state what in-
formation is sought and to deﬁne robust methods to obtain it. This may
be due to DNOs’ inexperience with the speciﬁcation, management and
execution of RD&D projects. Of 63 projects reviewed, 30 had a uni-
versity as a delivery partner; a key aspect of a university's contribution
should be expertise on the framing, testing and reporting of research,
but it appears this may not have always been utilised eﬀectively.
The analysis of project learning (Section 6.2) shows that, for several
innovation areas, projects produced either contradictory evidence
(opposite conclusions on potential for innovation adoption in core
business) or were unanimously inconclusive. This observation is based
on the evidence as presented and our interpretation of it. A detailed
comparison of the trial context or method to explore reasons behind the
diﬀering conclusions has not been conducted. Nonetheless, our review
highlights a failure of the set of trials addressing an apparently similar
innovation to deliver clear messages to the sector and inform either the
readiness of the innovation for adoption or the need for further devel-
opment and evaluation work. Further work by the DNOs involved to
compare trial results, explain diﬀerences in conclusions and
recommend next steps is needed. Comparing this result with the lit-
erature reviewed in Section 4, DNO perceptions of potential beneﬁt
from innovations, as reported from survey responses, appears sig-
niﬁcantly more positive than the evidence they report in project
learning outcomes.
Although some guidance on potential technology areas and network
challenges was provided to DNOs (Ofgem, 2010a), a strategic approach
to addressing uncertainty was not established for the LCNF. The lack of
a framework for collaborative RD&D with clear guidance and meth-
odologies for knowledge capture and sharing may be a contributory
factor to the LCNF's failure to consistently produce strong, clear evi-
dence regarding an innovations potential for core business. It is notable
that in March 2017 Ofgem issued a policy decision requiring DNOs to
develop a joint innovation strategy that should include aspects such as:
identiﬁcation of key challenges and uncertainties, gap analysis, and
coordination and collaboration across the sector (Ofgem, 2017d).
Although the successful delivery reward criteria (SDRC) for LCNF
projects included delivery of learning dissemination (Ofgem, 2010a),
the requirement was explicitly for delivery of the promised elements of
the project, e.g. of a demonstration. DNOs’ reporting of the ‘success’ of a
project was usually based on achieving the SDRC, not in terms of how
well the learning contributed to existing knowledge, identiﬁed and
addressed uncertainty, and contributed to the key strategic challenges
facing the sector. As a consequence, it is likely that learning on
equipment or methods that proved not be eﬀective was under-reported.
The analysis of learning output quality presented in this paper
suggests that the process for assessing LCNF project success failed to
place enough emphasis on what evidence was sought and the quality of
what was obtained. It should also be noted that projects concerned
innovations that might be adopted by DNOs and, as a consequence, the
DNOs have tended to report the potential beneﬁts in respect of their
own current responsibilities, e.g. development and maintenance of
distribution network capacity. However, the potential beneﬁts of sto-
rage and ﬂexible demand extend beyond the conﬁnes of a DNO and
represent potentially valuable ancillary services to the transmission
system's operator (Bell et al., 2017).
8. Policy recommendations
The following policy recommendations are drawn from the results
of this study. They are set out within the context of UK electricity
network innovation funding mechanisms, but can be applied more
broadly to policy supporting energy technology innovation.
8.1. Setting a clear learning agenda
A strategic approach to learning should be a core part of the design
Fig. 9. Innovation adoption readiness scores for network visibility projects.
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of energy network innovation funding mechanisms with an agreed
agenda around the top priorities for sectoral innovation and the type of
work that needs to be done to reach joint goals. This should clearly
acknowledge that innovation of long-term beneﬁt to energy users can
concern not only technology but also methods, working practices and
commercial or regulatory arrangements and should be supported by a
new set of deﬁnitions of innovation maturity and commercial viability
that is not limited to technology. The current state of knowledge should
be set out with a clear articulation of the critical uncertainties.
Alignment with other relevant national and international innovation
agendas should be explicit.
8.2. A focus on capacity building
The starting baseline of network licensee RD&D capacity should be
well understood and should inform the expected scale of activity during
diﬀerent time periods of the funding mechanism. This should also in-
clude the capacity to engage widely with relevant stakeholders in the
sector. For example, the analysis of the LCNF engagement in Section
6.1.3 demonstrates widespread engagement with academic partners,
but less so with local actors whose priorities may be driving speciﬁc
changes in electricity network use. The extent of university and con-
sultancy ﬁrm involvement provides a positive indicator of DNO will-
ingness to collaborate with wider stakeholders and oﬀers further evi-
dence that the LCNF stimulated DNO RD&D activity that reached across
the sector; however, it also provides an indication of a requirement for
support, associated with a lack of innovation capacity. By under-
standing the capacity baseline, along with the critical uncertainties and
the sectoral learning priorities, funding priorities can be developed. For
example, establishing where a focus on demonstration of a relatively
mature innovation is appropriate or where the focus should be on
building capacity and accelerating the development of an immature
innovation.
8.3. Evaluating project success
Successful delivery criteria linked to a recoverable funding con-
tribution, as demonstrated by the LCNF, may be an appropriate method
of incentivising performance in learning outputs in regulated industries;
however, reward criteria must be focussed on the quality of learning
outputs not just their delivery. A framework for shaping, capturing and
assessing the learning outputs of the funded innovation projects is es-
sential.
The framework should support both assessment of projects at the
bid stage and ongoing evaluation of success, and should be oriented
towards the following: are projects targeting key uncertainties with an
appropriate set of planned experiments and, once funded, are they
producing high quality learning that moves the knowledge of the sector
forward? And, if core business deployment is not yet fully proven, can
the knowledge generated and shared be easily built on by a subsequent
innovation projects?
In concert with an industry innovation strategy, the framework
proposed in Section 4 for evaluating innovation adoption readiness
could provide a useful component of ongoing formal evaluation of the
‘success’ of innovation projects. It could be enhanced to allow formal
self-assessment of an innovation's readiness as an option ready to be
deployed when required and the required progression in respect of
reduction of uncertainty and increase in maturity and commercial
viability, accompanied by an in-depth discussion of the supporting
evidence produced by the project. For projects with a positive score, a
description of the expected pathway towards deployment should be
provided. This ‘innovation adoption readiness pathway’ could then be
subject to independent expert scrutiny and would support ongoing
knowledge capture, strategy development, and appropriate design of
future innovation projects.
9. Conclusions
This paper has assessed the outputs and eﬀectiveness of the UK's
ﬂagship £500m Low Carbon Networks Fund in a bid to inform future
policy making on energy network innovation funding. The research
ﬁnds that the LCNF has facilitated wide-scale knowledge generation.
Compared with the situation before LCNF and its smaller scale pre-
decessor, the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI), the DNOs in Great
Britain are considerably more active in RD&D since the LCNFs in-
troduction, collaborating extensively within the sector, particularly
with academic partners. This suggests that without the LCNF ‘business
as usual’ would have remained unchallenged and DNOs would not have
sought to innovate their core business in a bid to accelerate a low-
carbon transition. Consequently, the LCNF represents a leading example
of a regulatory policy that has encouraged a step-change of innovation
activity across the electricity network industry.
Even so, the study ﬁnds that whilst the level of RD&D has increased
dramatically, activity could have been even greater as the full funding
allocation was not utilised. The attention given to TRLs as an indicator
of the maturity of a proposed innovation or the degree of uncertainty
associated with it is likely to have led to a focus on technology. There
has been relatively little attention to novel methods, working practices
or commercial arrangements. In addition, the majority of innovation
delivered has been incremental in nature, more concerned with adding
network assets that are new to the DNOs and local control rather than
more extensive control to optimise network utilisation. The evidence
provided by published learning outputs has been either contradictory or
inconclusive for several innovations. For two aspects of common con-
cepts of ‘smart grids’ – ﬂexible demand and storage – LCNF ﬁndings as
to the case for adoption as standard options within DNOs’ core business
are particularly mixed.
It has been argued that use of customers’ money or public funds is
justiﬁed if it reduces uncertainty and generates knowledge that beneﬁts
customers in the long term. Key policy recommendations relevant to
design support mechanism for energy sector innovation are: the need
for a strategic approach to reducing uncertainty; a focus on capacity
building; and a framework for evaluating the quality of innovation
project learning, similar to that implemented in this study. This paper
has focussed on evaluation of published project outputs. Future work to
further establish the value of the LCNF, NIC and NIA would be: eva-
luation of innovation adoption within DNO RIIO business plans and a
comparison with analogous schemes in other countries to identify best-
practice.
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